UK Mosque Statistics for 2015 
The Mosques Statistics report for 2015 has just been published on my website, at

I have not yet completed the updated political-boundary-related data analysis; this will follow next month, insha'Allah. Also, there are a few refinements that I intend to apply to the document as published, which will also follow shortly, insha'Allah.

Meanwhile, here are some highlights:

There are currently 1695 actual masjids in the UK, up from 1640 in October 2014.
The actual changes include 84 premises that are now defunct - some of those will be places that have been long defunct that I have caught up with and corrected, but about half are places that communities have moved from, so while the net increase is 55 new masjids, actually there are about 100 new masjids that have been reported to in the last year of which about 40 are replacement premises.

About 460 masjids and organisations providing prayer space, are registered charities. (There are about 1100 organisations on the England and Wales Register of Charities that include the terms "Muslim" or "Islam" in their title or keywords.)

Deobandi-oriented masjids are still circa 43% of all UK masjids, with 25 more masjids thus associated in the last year.

Likewise Bareilvi-oriented masjids are still 24%, with 28 more.

Salafi-oriented masjids have increased from 7% to 8.6%, i.e. 155 masjids and 34 more than last year. Note the trend - there are significantly more new Salafi-oriented masjids than either of the old-guard 'mainstream', and this trend continues from the previous two years.

Most other identifiable orientations/flavours/denominations remain static. The number of non-denominational prayer rooms that I have recorded has shrunk considerably from 175 to 125 - this is down to more diligent checks on these often elusive locations.

This year I have introduced a few categories to cover those very few masjids who are able to justify their claims to be non-sectarian, and have recorded 5 "Inclusive, unaffiliated Sunni", 3 "Exclusive, unaffiliated Sunni" (who methodically ban all practices and events in their masjids except salaah), and 4 "Modernist" (who entertain interpretations of Islamic practice that are controversially distant from orthodox interpretations - these are all intolerant of alternatives to their own idiosyncratic practices).

Women's access to masjids is met by 70% of UK masjids, 100% for Shi'a, 95% for Salafi and 92% for "Arabic mainstream Sunni", (i.e. native Arab-speaking imams and managements who practice taqleed-oriented fiqh). However only 50% of Deobandi masjids, and 83% of Bareilvi ones, provide for women. This Deobandi figure is a drop from last year, but arises from my better understanding of the substantial Bangladeshi Deobandi influenced masjids. Very few Bangladeshi masjids of any persuasion have facilities for women, and this ethnic factor is one of the refinements I will be introducing to the report soon, insha'Allah.

My Muslim Council of Britain affiliates analysis shows that the MCB does entertain a diverse range of affiliates, but only 10% of Deobandi masjids have affiliated, though they are 40% of the MCB's masjid affiliates. 73% of 'Islamic Movement', Maudoodi-inspired masjids are affiliates, but are only 19% of the MCB's masjid affiliate composition. The MCB's claimed total of affiliates still includes 22 masjid organisations that are actually defunct,long-gone. The bottom line is that the MCB claims the affiliations of 197 or 12% of the UK's masjids.

On the other hand, while the British Muslim Forum is 99% Bareilvi, there has been no sign of activity from the BMF for many years. Recent claims in the press for an individual to be heading the "Muslim Forum", might be signs of a revival, but there has been no evidence of any actual entity by that name, or revival of the BMF either, that has crossed's path. Were it functioning, the BMF would be claiming 231 affiliates, 14%; but apart from an open letter after the 7/7 bombing, there is next to no other evidence of the BMF's existence.

Meanwhile MINAB, which is very cagey about just who its affiliates are, has a non-functional website but claims 600 affiliates on Wikipedia. Based on data it published and then withdrew in 2011, I have identified just 93.

I have generated breakdowns of affiliates for some local groups, in particular Bradford and Tower Hamlets Councils of Mosques - the latter has one Bareilvi affiliate out of 54, the only one in Tower Hamlets, but 5 of the 7 Sufi Fultoli-influenced masjids there, demonstrating the significance of that body which is little known outside of Bangladeshi communities.

One significant change I have introduced is to rationalise my data on masjid managements' cultural/ethnic orientation. I only have this for about half the UK's masjids, but I have standardised it and associated it with regions as well. I would be the first to accept that it is contraversial - as generations pass, more of the people in charge of masjids are people who have been born in and identify primarily with the UK culturally. However I strongly contend that along with factional sectarian exclusiveness, cultural exclusiveness makes the masjid a very alienating place for neophytes, for users from other cultures, and especially for converts. I believe that such alienation is the principle reason for on the one hand, converts and neophytes turning to alternative narratives, including extreme ones, rejecting 'orthodoxy', and on the other hand, masjid managements claiming with total sincerity that they are totally opposed to extremism and violence, honestly denying they have any sign of it in their masjid, yet are completely flummoxed when families and children from their own neighbourhood community turn up in court on terrorism charges, or in Syria or Afghanistan.

Anyway, the masjid management ethnic association statistics show:

86.2% of UK masjids are exclusively managed by committees entirely culturally from the Indian subcontinent. I expect this figure to be bigger still when I identify more such data - it is only the more diverse managements that have more accessible inmformation that makes a point of their cultural diversity.
2.1% of UK masjids have committees or trustees made up from people from more than one continent.
Just a mere 6 masjids, 0.3%, have any converts/reverts at all, even just one, involved in running the masjid. After more than three generations in the UK, innumerable conversions/shahadahs, and abundant capable and articulate people to draw upon, that figure must be a national scandal for Muslims who consider the UK to be their future.

4 masjids have specific Saudi influence in their management, and 20, 1.9%, have Arabian peninsula or Levantine interests, including just one UK masjid with a single Syrian person involved. That last is a very significant consideration for the burgeoning refugee crisis as Asia Minor collapses. Likewise, there are 4 masjids with Kurdish influence.

Finally, about 800 masjids of the 1047 thus analysed, have committees and trustees that are exclusively Pakistani, or exclusively Bangladeshi, or exclusively Gujerati. The remaining 600-700 un-analysed, are most likely to be added to that last total.

Britain's 32 biggest masjids are listed - no special surprise and no change on previous years except removal of an erroneously overstated entry.

I have generated a breakdown of masjid sizes that corresponds approximately to house conversions, commercial conversions and new-builds, and 1000+ institutions, with last year's data to compare. There have been no changes at the big end, almost all new locations are around the 50 to 200 people sizes. This could either be because there is little demand for creating major masjids, or that major masjid projects have been regularly blocked. However, from a planning perspective, the organic growth of masjid projects from small to medium to large, has significant ramifications in residential areas where they start as house or small shop conversions.

Lastly I continue to publish the numbers of unique visitors to the website, and this continues to grow steadily. The directory underwent some major changes earlier this year to make it suitable for mobile devices, and traffic has grown to around 150,000 unique visitors per month. This large number, along with the statistic that states that I now claim and report first-hand knowledge of 887 out of 1834 places of Muslim worship (and 652 others with multiple corroboratory sources), and a library of several thousand photographs covering about 600 masjids, I hope emphasises the quality and credibility of the data I have sourced personally, and from a band of helpful supporters, and from the amorphous 'crowd' who submit a steady flow of arbitrary updates and corrections. Many thanks to any of you that have assisted with this project, and may you receive the benefit that accrues through helping others establish and run the masjids, and especially helping those who need to find a place to perform their ritual salaah, the ability to do so with safety and confidence.

The directory is of course on the website, at

Mehmood Naqshbandi
23rd September 2015


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The Muslim Vote and Marginal Constituencies 
Can The Muslim vote upset any Westminster candidates?

There are 36 Westminster constituencies where the 2010 election majority is less than the number of mosque spaces, by at least 1000, and another 17 where that number is at least 100. Mosque spaces do not equate to voters, or even, to be honest, to people. However they are quite a good proxy for the potential for a Bradford West effect, where George Galloway turned the established candidates' presumptions about ethnic minority voting upside-down. So what is the impact of the Muslim vote? Is it homogeneous and party-loyal? (No! - see for yourself.) And how do you reach it?

Does it matter? When the mainstream parties overlook the cultural influences that sway many in their constituencies, the results can be a shock to their complacency, as George Galloway demonstrated, but they can also be profoundly disturbing, as today's finding on Lutfur Rahman's exploitation of the Bangladeshi Tower Hamlets vote demonstrated, "The mayoral election in the east London borough will be rerun after Lutfur Rahman and his supporters were found to have been involved in vote-rigging, seeking spiritual influence through local imams, and wrongly branding his Labour rival a racist." So it does matter - if only a few have privileged access to a substantial part of the electorate, that is corruption. Countering corruption, gives everyone, here and now, access to that pert of the electorate. Here is Lutfur Rahman's erstwhile constituency, the London Borough of Tower Hamlets. Use our search tool to pick every mosque in any other local authority if you please.

And here is an Excel spreadsheet with the 53 constituencies and the data. It opens with a link for each constituency to the Google Map of the mosques/masjids in that constituency. This spreadsheet was updated on 9th May to change the hyperlinks to account for a recent change to the website's programs. (Note that Excel should give you a warning about unsecure internet links - if you are unhappy, try the search directly on the search feature instead, or download the much bigger PDF statistical report that compiles.)

The numbers are from the October 2014 release of the Statistics report, and the links to the live data will have some discrepancies with this due to the live list showing only the grade A, B and C data e.g. Bradford West has 48 places on the map list, and 53 below including grade D and E, though all are shown as rich-data landmarks on the map, so you aren't missing anything. More dramatically, Poplar and Limehouse has 22 on the statistics, but 33 grade A, B and C on the map, plus 1 grade D and 3 defunct, due to some recent groundwork by in the area.

Here's the simple list:

Constituency Mosques Total Winning Balance of Incumbent Member, 2014
Mosque Party Mosque capacity
Capacity over majority
Bradford West 53 40841 Lab>Rsp 35078 George Galloway (Respect)
Bradford East 29 22608 LD 22243 David Ward (LD)
Birmingham, Ladywood 42 30302 Lab 20197 Shabana Mahmood (L)
Birmingham, Hall Green 38 19145 Lab 15346 Roger Godsiff (L)
Blackburn 45 24365 Lab 14509 Jack Straw (L)
Leicester South 34 21435 Lab 12627 Jon Ashworth (L)
Dewsbury 21 13885 Con 12359 Simon Reevell (C)
Luton South 18 13390 Lab 11061 Gavin Shuker (L)
Rochdale 17 11800 Lab 10911 Simon Danczuk (L)
Walsall South 19 12390 Lab 10635 Valerie Vaz (L)
Birmingham, Yardley 13 10540 LD 7538 John Hemming (LD)
Oldham E & Saddleworth 13 6570 Lab 6467 Debbie Abrahams (L)
Manchester, Gorton 16 12130 Lab 5427 Gerald Kaufman (L)
Batley and Spen 17 9800 Lab 5394 Mike Wood (L)
Wolverhampton SW 5 5810 Con 5119 Paul Uppal (C)
Sheffield Central 13 5185 Lab 5020 Paul Blomfield (L)
Birmingham, Hodge Hill 42 14885 Lab 4583 Liam Byrne (L)
Bethnal Green and Bow 24 16050 Lab 4476 Rushanara Ali (L)
Brent Central 8 5400 LD 4055 Sarah Teather (LD)
Hampstead and Kilburn 7 4050 Lab 4008 Glenda Jackson (L)
Westminster North 4 5870 Lab 3744 Karen Buck (L)
Halifax 10 5095 Lab 3623 Linda Riordan (L)
Pendle 13 5960 Con 2375 Andrew Stephenson (C)
Burnley 10 4150 LD 2332 Gordon Birtwistle (LD)
Brentford and Isleworth 6 4130 Con 2172 Mary Macleod (C)
Dudley North 2 2800 Lab 2151 Ian Austin (L)
Bury North 6 4000 Con 1757 David Nuttall (C)
Bedford 7 2970 Con 1617 Richard Fuller (C)
Harrow East 4 5000 Con 1597 Bob Blackman (C)
Peterborough 7 6400 Con 1539 Stewart Jackson (C)
Southampton, Test 6 3870 Lab 1457 Alan Whitehead
Hyndburn 12 4490 Lab 1400 Graham Jones (L)
Lancaster and Fleetwood 6 1660 Con 1327 Eric Ollerenshaw (C)
Poplar and Limehouse 22 7250 Lab 1220 Jim Fitzpatrick (L)
Tooting 4 3550 Lab 1026 Sadiq Khan (L)
Keighley 7 3950 Con 1010 Kris Hopkins (C)
Nottingham East 14 7800 Lab 831 Chris Leslie (L)
Kingston upon Hull Nth 2 1450 Lab 809 Diana Johnson (L)
Leeds North East 5 5350 Lab 805 Fabian Hamilton (L)
Bolton North East 10 4860 Lab 776 David Crausby (L)
Hendon 2 880 Con 774 Matthew Offord (C)
Swansea West 4 1210 Lab 706 Geraint Davies (L)
Norwich South 4 950 LD 640 Simon Wright (LD)
Edinburgh South 3 900 Lab 584 Ian Murray (L)
Watford 3 1850 Con 425 Richard Harrington (C)
Nottingham South 8 2170 Lab 398 Lilian Greenwood (L)
Wakefield 4 2000 Lab 387 Mary Creagh (L)
Stockton South 3 650 Con 318 James Wharton (C)
Thurrock 1 330 Con 238 Jackie Doyle-Price (C)
Sherwood 1 400 Con 186 Mark Spencer (C)
Huddersfield 10 4630 Lab 158 Barry Sheerman (L)
Bolton West 1 200 Lab 108 Julie Hilling (L)

© Mehmood Naqshbandi 2015,

‘n/a’ – Not Available. Religious affiliation data is not published for Scotland or Northern Ireland.

Let's be clear what we are measuring here. The number of spaces in a mosque is a slightly subjective measure. For most prayers, the numbers attending will be small, even minute. For Friday Jumu'ah salaah, however, most masjids are full. Many are heaving; many have two, and some even three, sittings for Friday salaah. But a third of UK masjids have no facilities for women, and even those that do, have very few women attending. (A few of those even state, "no space for women at Jumu'ah", because they give priority to the crowds of men wanting to make Jumu'ah.) So these numbers are a proxy for the local male Muslim populations. Salaah is encumbent on adults, not children, so the numbers attending who are too young to vote, will be a very small proportion of the congregations. Not all nominal Muslims are conscientious practitioners, and not all will be present for every Friday Jumu'ah.

But in spite of these caveats, and arguably because of them, the numbers of spaces in UK mosques is a reasonable approximation to the number of adult males that see the political world through a consciously Muslim perspective, and can be doubled to include an approximation of a comparable number of like-minded Muslim women. (Just to test that out, if we assume that half of the Census Muslim population is eligible to vote (parents, over-18 children, grandparents), only in two of the 53 constituencies does the mosque capacity exceed half the residing Muslim populations, due to minor anomalies on where the masjids have been built. See the spreadsheet for the comparisons with local populations.)

In case you are unfamiliar with the website, you can find all the mosques/masjids in any UK constituency or ward by searching for the constituency or ward by name or part of its name in the search feature. If you don't know the name, just search on the relevant town or county. The results will include a link to each kind of match, e.g. searching for 'bradford' gives:
Search results for "bradford"

Towns: Bradford(80)
Localities: (central Bradford)(2)
Boroughs: Bradford(88)
Constituencies: Bradford East(28), Bradford South(3), Bradford West(48)
Wards: Bradford Moor(9)
Name and Address Matches(3)
where the number in brackets is the number of mosques or places such as hired halls included.

When you select a result, you will get the map page and a list of mosques or a summary for the area. You can then pick the individual mosques in the results:
Browse by constituency (specified for all mosques)
Browse by ward (specified for all mosques)
Easier to try than to explain!

The map loads with a landmark for each mosque, with colour and other codes to show its cultural affiliations, scaled to its size, etc. Click on the landmark to reveal a wealth of information - contacts, website, photos, charity link, and Google Streetview of the front door, and Bing 3D view.

Note that Google Maps has to load over two thousand landmarks, so this may be slow on old computers, and if you are accessing the search from a mobile phone, if you have allowed it to use your position, it will show you your nearest mosques instead.

Keep in mind that the mosque directory has very rich features, such as several thousand original photographs (we visit the mosques we list!), multiple checks for accuracy, and pinpoint location data, plus a Satnav download. Many other mosque directories are crude copies of data, without the technical skills or coverage to keep their data up to date, whereas we have been collecting this data since the late 1980s, update several times a week, and have detailed local histories to understand the local context.


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Why a comprehensive theological response to ISIS is desperately needed. 
Mehdi Hasan has published a critique of the article by Graeme Wood in the Atlantic ("What ISIS Really wants"), How Islamic is Islamic State? in the New Statesman this week, with the rhetorical implication that it is really not Islamic at all (Mehdi's byline, "The conventional wisdom suggests a violent reading of the Quran is at the heart of Islamic State's political violence – but it's wrong."). When the Atlantic article appeared, I described it as important because it highlights the aspects of ISIS that appeal to its potential recruits. However Mehdi Hasan considers that Wood's article is intended to support the illiberal view that the problem with ISIS is actually a problem that the West has with Islam, and that it is poorly researched. My endorsement of Wood's Atlantic article is that the key information he does present, does demonstrate ISIS's use of millenarian and faux-Salafi theology. Mehdi Hasan points out that in reality ISIS is a cobbled together allegiance of AQ splinters, former Ba'athists and organised criminal gangs, not a theological movement. He is probably right, but Ba'athism doesn't have a following in the West, and organised crime is, one might say, a law unto itself. The arguments, rationale and propaganda that draw Western Muslims to ISIS, are very much a theological problem that Muslims must face down, and which ISIS has manipulated intelligently.

I would probably agree with much of what Mehdi Hasan has written elsewhere, and the citations he makes in this New Statesman article include ones that I would strongly endorse. Mehdi Hasan expresses strong scepticism of Wood's assertion that ISIS's violence has theological roots: he quotes Wood, “The religion preached by its most ardent followers derives from coherent and even learned interpretations of Islam.”. Yes, Mehdi Hasan is right insofar as ISIS's theology is not congruent to mainstream Sunni Islam, nor even to Salafi theological representations. But Graeme Wood's article, or the one I cited by Hassan Hassan of a similar nature, is important because ISIS's audience is not mainstream Sunni scholars, it is those who are already deeply distrustful of the Muslim establishment. It is a big audience, it comprises, in every masjid in Britain, educated second or third generation young Muslims who despair of the kindergarten level of instruction that is the limit of what their local imam can provide. It is the idealistic convert who has been sold an idea of Islam as the pure way of life, achievable by strict adherence to easily accessible translations of Qur'an and Hadeeth, and corrupted by tribalistic politics of elderly Asian mosque committees. In France, it is an audience of autodidactic religious revivalists who are repulsed by highly secularised North African elders that are sycophants of a populist culture that rejects them.

The rationale that ISIS communicates through its acolytes to potential recruits is couched in religious terms, with references to Islamic sources: the Qur'an, Hadeeth and the Seerah of the Salaf as-Saliheen. So if they are to be won back, the potential recruits deserve, and are in desperate need of, firmly rooted Islamic rebuttals. Those rebuttals need to come from the mimbars of their masjids in Tower Hamlets and Saltley, and from their peers and elders in UK schools and colleges, not in some wholesome but obscure and dismissive intellectual reasoning from Al Azhar or Cambridge. Those attracted to ISIS from European and especially UK cities, not only do not have the depth of classical, orthodox Sunni, theological learning, they are actually deeply sceptical of its purveyors, and their local imams and alims have the poorest record imaginable of being able to communicate such knowledge. On the other hand, throughout the UK, and actually throughout Europe for slightly different reasons, those same newer generations, neophytes and converts to Islam, have had two or three decades of exposure to home-grown theology, from varying Salafi and proto-Salafi advocates, Hizb-ut-Tahrir propagators, vociferous catch-me-if-you-can militants in the very pliable Muhajiroun mould, and actually, including numerous purveyors of an ultra-lberal Islam that find Islamic justifications for khutbah in vernacular and female imams at Jumu'ah, and all those who thumb through books of knowledge to find justifications for their own gripes against their own local Muslim 'establishment'. All these people and their audiences, are completely familiar with the methods of propagation that ISIS uses. They are familiar with the doomsday warnings for the non-compliant, the extraordinary depth, range and co-optability of Islamic sources, the morbid dwelling on the state of Muslims in 'the final days', and the possibility that ISIS might be part of that showdown.

All ISIS needs to do, and has done, is to put forward more cogent arguments in their own favour, in a format and with sources that the recipients are familiar with, for numbers, on the periphery, small but steadily growing and very significant, to be persuaded that ISIS is on their side, that the horror and fear expressed by popular media is evidence of ISIS's robust stand against a West that despises Islam. In our academic and analytical comfort we can state the obvious about ISIS's cynicism, its manipulation, its internal contradictions and sheer mendacity. But for young Muslims especially, and those who are troubled by the dischordant clash between their own lives, the ideals of a simple Muslim way of life, the corruption and decadence of the society they are growing up in, and especially the compromises and hypocrisy of their own parents, the ISIS message offers a resolution.

Mehdi Hasan's first point is about the lack of religious knowledge among ISIS's groundlings, 'According to François, “It was more hammering what they were believing than teaching us about the Quran. Because it has nothing to do with the Quran.” And the former hostage revealed to a startled Amanpour: “We didn’t even have the Quran. They didn’t want even to give us a Quran.”'

Mehdi Hasan is scathing of Wood's sources: "Bernard Haykel of Princeton University, the only scholar of Islam whom Wood bothered to interview, described Muslims who considered Isis to be un-Islamic, or anti-Islamic, as “embarrassed and politically correct, with a cotton-candy view of their own religion”, and declared that the hand-choppers and throat-slitters of Isis “have just as much legitimacy” as any other Muslims, because Islam is “what Muslims do and how they interpret their texts”. Mehdi Hasan and others should disagree with this insofar as orthodoxy by definition is that which places its authority in a widely accepted and long maintained corpus of religious material. The problem is, as I stated in my endorsement of the Wood article, that ISIS has been very successful at recruiting the unorthodox, radical, militant dissenters: not the intellectual dissenters but the unfulfilled ones. It has done so by exploiting the methods that Salafis have been practising among Islam's western diaspora for nearly three decades, and which are therefore familiar, challenging, methods of discourse for their recruits. They were methods that succeeded in the original wave of Salafi revival two or three decades ago, precisely because they challenged orthodoxy, they called out the traditional scholars of islam, the imams and alims of innumerable masjids away from the centres of Islamic learning. And the Hanafi, Shafi'i, even Hanbali imams and alims had no training in standing up for orthodox Sunni Islam, whatever its preferred flavour, Deobandi, Bareilvi, al Azhar, or even the rigidly conforming Saudi-employed scholars of orthodoxy.

Now that Islamic orthodoxy has been seen to fail to counter the challenges thrown down in reasonable matters by reasonable Salafis, the field is wide open to anyone, faux-Salafi, who can use the same methods to drive rather more fantastic demands. Their usually young, often disaffected, too often dissatisfied convert, audiences know that orthodox alims and imams are mute. If they weren't already mute from the absence of counter arguments, they are most certainly muted by governments and media hounds for whom any discussion of anything but the "politically correct, ... cotton-candy view of their own religion” is tantamount to endorsing extremism.

Hasan's first witness is Mark Sageman. "Few experts have done more to try to understand the mindset of the young men and women who aspire to join the blood-drenched ranks of groups such as Isis and al-Qaeda than Sageman. [...] in his acclaimed works Understanding Terror Networks and Leaderless Jihad, [that] closely analysed the biographies of several hundred terrorists." I agree.

Hasan on Sageman: '“Religion has a role but it is a role of justification,” he tells me. “It’s not why they do this [or] why young people go there.”' [If I quoted much more of Sageman here I would be pirating Hasan's work, but ... ] 'For converts to Islam in particular, he adds, “Identity is important to them. They have . . . invested a lot of their own efforts and identity [...] They see other Muslims being slaughtered [and say], ‘I need to protect my community.’” Hasan again: "(A recent study found that converts to Islam were involved in 31 per cent of Muslim terrorism convictions in the UK between 2001 and 2010.)" Indeed, a fact that continues to stress till we hyperventilate!

More essential wisdom from Sageman, quoted by Hasan: '“You don’t have the most religious folks going there,” he points out. Isis fighters from the west, in particular, “tend to have rediscovered Islam as teenagers, or as converts”; they are angry, or even bored, young men ..."' and crucially, referencing 'the Lebanese-American former FBI agent Ali H Soufan, "I knew far more of the Quran than they did [...] the limits of their knowledge enabled me and my colleagues to use their claimed piousness against them.”' This is exactly MuslimsInBritain's point about why a cogent, comprehensive and cross-factional theological rebuttal is desperately needed. It isn't coming from our supposed 'alims and imams, they only know why, as Deobandis, the Bareilvis are 'qabr pujaris', or why, as Bareilvis, the Deobandis are 'ghustaq-e-Rasool', and anyone who isn't a Bareilvi is a 'Wahabbi' and in the pay of Saudi Arabia's Waqf Ministry. (Actually the most potent and well presented sectarian Salafi literature is written by mother-tongue English converts and published in the UK.) If the rebuttal of ISIS ever comes, it must be one hundred percent clear that it is uniform across Islam and that its authors can and will argue it through to every Muslim malcontent in the land. If instead it simply becomes a line of division, the polarisation of the Muslim community will actually and substantially increase support for ISIS.

Hasan's next witness is Restricted, who revealed him/her/itself to the Guardian in 2008, probably because it was a vital message that needed to be understood in public, and is still not understood by much of the media or even the security commentariat (probably because they would no longer be able to justify their sometimes idiotic and usually wrong pronouncements made for jackpot consultancy fees). This time I will quote Hasan quoting the Guardian:
“Far from being religious zealots, a large number of those involved in terrorism do not practise their faith regularly. Many lack religious literacy and could . . . be regarded as religious novices.” The MI5 analysts noted the disproportionate number of converts and the high propensity for “drug-taking, drinking alcohol and visiting prostitutes [...] A well-established religious identity actually protects against violent radicalisation.” Quite right, if I say so myself! Again, that is actually why the Graeme Wood article, and the Weiss and Hassan study, are so important: Orthodox, mainstream Muslim alims and imams continue to fail to provide anything more than primary-school madrassah, learn-by-rote instruction in Islamic belief and practice. For converts and neophytes, the field is wide open and well populated with offers of instruction, help and guidance from anyone with a soapbox to exhort from. A very few of these are managed by a very few of the larger mosques, but even these are hidebound by the mosque's own approved sectarian allegiances. The internet provides a more accessible and readily available medium. What are now known as self-radicalisation and on-line radicalisation, and which is now recognised to be the norm for most European-based Muslims undertaking an extremist action, are actually subsets of the process of radicalisation I have been describing continuously for the twelve years that I have been contributing to analysis and understanding of violent extremism among Muslims. The Security Service document makes plain that those motivated to extremist violence are not able to be profiled through common, objective characteristics. The concepts of self- and on-line radicalisation undermine the security establishment's notion of a conveyor belt to extremism or an underground network of recruiting agents. The missing factor in European Muslim radicalisation is the one that I have continually been expounding, the 'push' factor, which is far stronger than the 'pull' factor, and it consists of disaffected neophytes' repeated and deep-felt rejection of and by, the European Muslim mainstream.

Mehdi Hasan's next witness illustrates this perfectly: "... Mohammed Ahmed and Yusuf Sarwar, the two young British Muslim men from Birmingham who were convicted on terrorism charges in 2014 after travelling to fight in Syria, bought copies of Islam for Dummies and The Koran for Dummies from Amazon prior to their departure. Religious novices, indeed." They had grown up in traditional, Punjabi/Kashmiri communities in Pakistani-migrant Birmingham, and their orthodox education in Islam was so deficient that they had to start again as self-declared 'dummies'. What Hasan's anecdote does not explore, is what was it that made them decide not to take advice from the well-entrenched Muslim establishment. Handsworth's Muslim landscape is evenly divided between the two mutually loathing Bareilvi and Deobandi factions, both mainstream (8 mosques, 4 of each). It is because that well-entrenched Muslim establishment was too busy pronouncing takfir against each other based on an obscure 19th century quarrel, to have time to study the needs of their own children.

Hasan returns to Sageman, and again the point Hasan makes is right, and his conclusion from it is wrong. "Sageman ... says we have to locate terrorism and extremism in local conflicts rather than in grand or sweeping ideological narratives ..." He is referring to the roots of the ISIS crisis in Iraq and Syria, but what matters for our own safety and Muslims' future in Europe, is the faux-Salafi Islamic theology medium that ISISuses to attract its most potent operators from relatively comfortable London, Birmingham or Marseilles communities. It is the local conflicts there which matter, and the local conflicts in Handsworth and Tower Hamlets, in Sparkbrook and Beeston, in Derby and Dewsbury, is between disaffected Muslim youth and converts, and the complacent, self-satisfied Muslim establishment.

Mehdi Hasan cites MI6's Richard Barrett, again the focus being on the support for ISIS from within Syria and Iraq, and again while it is undoubtedly true that their motivations are often far from religious, “Acting in the name of Islam means that, for the ignorant at least, the groups have some legitimacy for their actions . . . They can pretend it is not just about power and money.” And again, for those signing up to ISIS from Europe, it most certainly isn't about power and money, it is about the perception of a legitimised jihad.

Hasan does turn to the orthodox Muslim establishment personified by the widely respected convert scholar, Abdul Hakim Murad in Cambridge. Unfortunately, Murad is a caricature of the distracted, idealistically liberal Muslim scholar that couldn't be more distant from the street-corner Islam that informs ISIS's recruits. Abdul Hakim Murad rightly differentiates between theological Salafi-ism and those who use the Salafi methods to perpetuate and deepen discord. 'Salafists tend to be apolitical, whereas groups such as Isis are intensely political. Even the traditionalist Murad, who has little time for what he has deemed the “cult-like universe of the Salafist mindset”, agrees that the rise of extremism within the movement is a consequence, rather than a cause, of violence and conflict.'

Probably the strongest of Mehdi Hasan's arguments is one of the points made by militant-turned-Sufi, Canadian Mubin Shaikh, who argues that, 'it is dangerous to grant Isis any kind of theological legitimacy amid efforts to formulate a coherent “countering violent extremism” (CVE) strategy in the west. “It is quite possibly a fatal blow in that regard because, essentially, it is telling Muslims to condemn that which is Islamic.” It is, he says, a “schizophrenic approach to CVE which will never succeed”.' But that is rather different from what is asking for. I am not asking to counter theology with theology: that would be as polarising (and therefore defeating) as trying to define 'moderate' ('good') from 'radical' ('bad') Muslims. wants to see 'alims and imams formulate between them, across their sects, a clear and comprehensive, wide-ranging debunking of ISIS's millenarian cult theology and have that propagated to every local mosque, madrassah, school and informal gathering. The material must unpick sectarian differences and not be weakened by the highest common factor on which sects currently agree. Crucially, those who use the confrontational devices that Salafis exploited in challenging the hegemony of village Islam in the UK's masjids, must recognise the damage those methodshave done and the way they are successfully exploited by ISIS. And equally crucially, the material must be accompanied by a determined effort to educate the two thousand or more alims and imams in the UK who currently are unable to propagate anything beyond madrassah basics and the Deobandi/Bareilvi/"Wahabbi" rant.

Hasan turns to the pollster, Dalia Mogahed and asks, 'What about Haykel’s claim that Isis fighters are constantly quoting Quranic verses and the hadith, or traditions from the life of the Prophet, and that they “mug for their cameras and repeat their basic doctrines in formulaic fashion and they do it all the time”? Why do they do that if they don’t believe this stuff – if it isn’t sincere? “The Quran [and] hadith according to whom?” she responds. “As interpreted by whom? As understood by whom?”' Rhetorical question in reply, but it has an answer all the same: according to those who have legitimised this manner of discourse that popularises challenges to mainstream Sunni orthodoxy: the street-corner preacher, the disaffected neophyte, the alienated convert. Precisely the people who deserve a response in terms they understand. '“Islam’s authorities have loudly and unanimously declared Isis un-Islamic.” Because of this, “Making a claim that violates normative principles of a philosophy, as defined by those with the authority to decide, is illegitimate.”' Pious words, but they merely strengthen the self-righteousness of the disaffected. 'For Mogahed, ... “a violent reading of the Quran is not leading to political violence. Political violence is leading to a violent reading of the Quran.”' Clever wordplay, but I would extend it, "Political violence [in Syria and Iraq] is leading to a violent reading of the Qur'an [on Commercial Road, E1].”'

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Anti-Semitism among UK Muslims 
I have been an active anti-racist campaigner all my adult life, on the streets against the National Front in the 1970s, on the ground in Apartheid South Africa, and right up to now. Since I entered Islam well over three decades ago, one thing that has stuck in my craw is the fact that anti-semitism is rife, endemic, in the Muslim community and is never challenged by Muslims. It exists among old Muslim men and among Muslim school children, among multi-generation families and recent migrants. It exists in every part of the country, but curiously, the more pernicious, caricature, racist forms of anti-semitism are to be found among the communities with least proximity to Jewish communities: Asian more than Arab and far more than Somali, for example; and less marked in parts of North London near well-established Jewish neighbourhoods where Muslim and Jewish institutions share the same streets. Many Muslims are not anti-semitic, but not a single Muslim will stand up and condemn this deep-rooted racism.

Are my experiences the exception? I don't think so. The directory provides from a certain perspective, arguably the most complete and accurate record of the impact of the Muslim religion on the UK, and you will see from it many hundreds of masjids where I personally have been, sometimes just passing, but many where I have stayed in the neighbourhood for weeks or months, or visited repeatedly. There is not a single place among them where if any conversation among Muslims turns to obstructions in the way of Muslim progress, be it somebody's career, plans for some new school or mosque project, depiction of Muslims in the media, or obstacles to Muslims getting their way on the world stage, then, if the conversation is among Muslims alone, there will be somebody, old or young, sycophantically moderate or firebrand radical, endowed with postnymical letters like PhD or on first name terms with the local street gangs, someone, who will chip in about how the Jews stitched the matter up, or some similar pejorative reference to the racist caricature of the devious Jew. This is not about masjids especially - the same applies whether it is in the masjid, in a dinner party, at home among relatives, among Muslim students on campus, or most pernicious of all, among pupils in or from a Muslim school. All of these and many more are my and my family's first-hand experience - and as I stated, that experience straddles the country. Lord Nazir Ahmed's outburst about Jews “who own newspapers and TV channels" in connection with his life-terminating mobile phone / driving technique may be among the most crass, but only because it was a prominent "community leader" and rendered on Pakistan TV. The enthusiasm with which Muslims embrace "theories" of Jewish conspiracies - 9/11 an inside job in which 'all the Jews stayed at home that day' (so the long list of Jewish victims is presumably fabricated as well), is simply the grossest example of Muslim dereliction of the powers of reason.

There are a few examples of positive relations, such as the Jamia Shan-e-Islam and its assistance to its neighbour in the street, the Bradford Reformed Synagogue, or the Muswell Hill Synagogue opening its doors to the jama'at of the firebombed Somali Bravanese Al-Rahma masjid. But these are isolated examples, newsworthy because they are so remarkably different to the norm. Fortunately thusfar, there have been no (attributable) direct attacks on Jews by UK Muslims, unlike say, an assault on a Shi'a by a convert "Sunni" in Edgware Road last year (to my knowledge the only reported example of Sunni-Shi'a conflict within the UK so far); or the vigilante-style assaults against women and gays, by convert Muslims again, around Whitechapel. And it is not for want of trying, and synagogues were certainly on the Crawley weedkiller bombers' agenda. Meanwhile, it is only a matter of time before either ISIS or Al Qaeda engineer a violent attack against Jews in the UK, or a local operator performs something similar while looking for kudos among fellow militants. Such an act will use the widespread anti-semitism among Muslims to compromise Muslim condemnation and add more fuel to the bonfire of Muslim aspirations in the West.

The persistence of anti-semitism in the Muslim community shows a profound failure by Muslims on two levels. Firstly, anti-semitism is naked racism. It cannot be excused by any political reference - Israel/Palestine is not a matter that British Jews are responsible for, or able to resolve, any more than British Muslims or British Arabs are. (Yet if Muslims were able to overcome their anti-semitic racism, the scope for dialogue between UK Jews and Muslims to influence Israel/Palestine could be profound.) It cannot be excused by theological arguments: the Messenger of Allah went to the Jews of Yathrib and other towns on the same basis as he went to the Christians and everyone else, "An Arab is not better than a non-Arab and a non-Arab is not better than an Arab, except in taqwa (awe of Allah)" [Bukhari 4:538]. Instead, the historic and the millenarian hadeeth refering to Jews, have been appropriated by militant extremists for their purposes because our inability to challenge anti-semitic racism among ourselves has made us unwilling to teach the theological contexts for these hadeeth.

Anti-semitism is the most toxic of many facets of our racism. I have written in various places about the pervasiveness of racism among Muslims: in broad terms, Arab racism towards Asians, Asian racism towards Africans and African-Caribbeans, tribal exclusiveness among Asian Muslim clans, and selective racism towards converts - when the convert agrees with you, mashallah she is very learned, and when the convert wants to marry your daughter, 'but what will happen when he converts back again?' (when you had her red passport reserved, in your mind, for a second-cousin's son with a green one!). Not long after I myself converted to Islam, among the numerous pamphlets and books passed on to me was a pamphlet about Leopold Weiss, a Jew who converted to Islam as Muhammad Asad and who wrote an exegesis, "The Message of the Qur'an": the pamphlet made derogatory claims about that book, the principle complaint being that its author had been Jewish and was therefore suspect. Anti-semitism is no different to any other form of racism - it is racism and it corrodes the mind of the perpetrator.

The second level in which anti-semitism demonstrates western Muslims' failure is in countering extremism. The Paris supermarket murders brought that into sharp focus. I wrote at the time that ISIS (the supermarket murderer Amédy Coulibaly claimed allegiance to ISIS, the Hebdo attack was claimed by Al Qaeda) cynically and deliberately used the attack to play on Muslim anti-semitism in order to exacerbate tensions between Muslims in the West and non-Muslims: both Al Qaeda and ISIS require Muslims to become disaffected from the West. Because anti-semitism is rife among Muslims, it is a powerful weapon for Al Qaeda and ISIS alike to manipulate; powerful because Muslims have almost no defence against it, and because for anyone not of the neo-fascist and neo-Nazi backside of the European Right, it is an unforgiveable throwback to Europe's most inglorious decade. And, probably not surprisingly, not only do we find "Holocaust deniers" among Muslims in Europe and elsewhere, but we also find a small number of converts to Islam who brought with them and still cling to, the same views of Jews as would have given them comfort in the ranks of the National Front as exposed in Maurice Ludmer's day in Searchlight.

Because anti-semitism is so widespread among the Muslim community, when the media do an exposé of some apparent extremist preacher in some very mainstream mosque in a decaying industrial town, the Muslim community look at each other in perplexity. Management committee shrugs its shoulders and say, 'well we didn't invite him' or 'extremism isn't allowed in our mosque', but among themselves they murmer that they really don't see anything extreme there, it must be a media conspiracy - they were tricked - the words were out of context. When in certain very prominent masjids, the pre-Jumu'ah bayaan, wa'az/wyaaz, non-ceremonial sermon, is delivered by an equally prominent 'alim in Urdu, surely someone must notice how gratuitously derogatory references to the Jews are rendered in the English translation as the 'iniquities of the non-Muslims', or some even more bland version. Yes, someone has noticed, else I would not be able to write this. But is it challenged? Not for a moment; on the contrary, the message plays to an audience who would not accept it any other way. So if Muslims cannot identify and challenge anti-semitic comments among our own, how will we ever be able to isolate and counter those who go further and take our children with them into fitna and violent extremism? The recent BBC/ComRes poll states, "Acts of violence against those who publish images of the Prophet Muhammad (S) can never be justified" yielded between 22 and 27% who disagreed, and 26 to 30% of Muslims who, "have some sympathy for the motives behind the attacks on Charlie Hebdo in Paris", and 42 to 47% who do not believe that, "Muslim clerics who preach that violence against the West can be justified are out of touch with mainstream Muslim opinion." None of the questions on the questionaire explicitly addressed the Jewish supermarket killings, which undermines the value of the questionaire. But it is not unreasonable for anyone reading the results and knowing the extent of Muslim anti-semitism, to extend the possibility of between 220 and 470 Muslims in this poll alone, and potentially therefore a large six-figure number of UK Muslims, to include a significant number of Muslims who would fail to recognise an exhortation to racist violence against Jews as being extreme. This is not the Daily Mail, nor is it Quilliam's partisan agenda. It is the considered opinion of someone who knows the Muslim community intimately across the country, who understands how extremism works, whose only agenda is to promote tolerance and an end to sectarianism between Muslims, not the interests of any particular sect or interpretation. I know very well that the propensity for violence that the cartoon publications stirred, is huge and cuts across generations, including especially the ashiks, lovers of the Prophet (S), who would be the first to condemn extremism, yet whose fury would be deep-throated against those who mock him. Not many people appreciate that difference, so cannot be blamed for interpreting the poll's quantity of tacit support for violence as including the murders of Jews shopping. That is a problem of epic proportions.

What happens when someone does challenge anti-semitism? "Evidence" is produced. Evidence takes the form of earnest recounting of the complex and obscure conspiracies that allowed 9/11 to happen, 7/7 to happen, even the sub-prime banking collapse to happen. Two days after the Paris attacks, the web-board gossip was about those attacks as a 'false flag operation'. I guess that's what happens when reading Al Qaeda's own house-journal's admissions is a criminal offence! But the credulousness of the Muslim community, especially the Asian Muslim community, beggars belief. To allow the 9/11 attacks to take place, half of the entire infrastructure management of the US eastern seaboard must have worked overtime on the conspiracy, and Bin Laden's revelling in his success is so obviously a fake!

Enough of complaining. This website is all about practical action. Two things are required, the same two things as I promoted in my "Problems and Practical Solutions" document (PDF, pages 15 and 23) and my Guide a decade ago:

One: UK Muslims and Jews including those of the most robust and contradictory viewpoints must sit down together and speak their minds frankly; this is not the time for gentle Interfaith or liberal pleasantries.

Why not follow the more normal route of simply ostracising and outlawing the extreme points of view, ridiculing their adherents and demonstrating that they are out of touch with the mainstream? Because these views, which are almost entirely about the status of Israel and Palestine, never have been confined to the margins. Simply labelling them as extremist positions doesn't alter the fact that there are very many people who hold them - the problem is that the viewpoints have never been seriously challenged within their respective communities: at least, among Muslims, there are plenty who justify Palestinian violence by reference to the enormous scale of Israeli-inflicted violence rather than decrying all of it; yet the same people would claim that they don't support political violence, terrorism etc. So instead of marginalising that kind of opinion, it is essential to challenge it in a way that forces all positions to recognise the implications of what they advocate.

There are hard conversations to be had, and it requires people with the bravery to argue in respectful dialogue with their counterparts through reasoned debate, challenging the counter-arguments, rebut and accept rebuttal, until the arguments have been exhausted. People of either side with less polarised views must also be part of the debate, who can test the strengths and validity of their own side's position as much as provide mediation with the counter-view. Polemical argument by its nature usually only succeeds in reinforcing the opinions of each advocate, and his followers go away convinced that they have won the arguments. This must be different - there must be no going away until every strongly held view has been either countered completely and withdrawn, or when both sides understand the substance and validity of the others' position. Recognition of this has to be in public. This is not something to happen in the rarified forum of supposed national leadership. It is something that has to be repeated up and down the land, in places where both parties are numerous and where one party is scarce, until it has touched every masjid, school or gathering of Muslims, and the equivalent for Jews. The debate will cover the politics of Israel and Palestine, the hard issues including people who challenge the very existence of Israel and of Palestine, and the role of support for either side within the UK and elsewhere. It will cover the theology, Jews in the Qur'an, Hadeeth and Muslim history, and Muslims interpretation of these, and corresponding controversial matters from the other side. It will also cover racism and the prevalence of old European anti-semitism tropes among new Muslim anti-semites, forced out until racism is separated from theology and politics, the racism binned and intelligent debate can begin on the politics and the theology. If we can achieve that, the politics and the theology will promise to be stimulating.

Two: Racism among Muslims must be stamped out. There must begin a concerted and co-ordinated campaign against all kinds of racism within the Muslim community and by Muslims against others. Racism is the enemy of Deen. Attacking racism in the past, has been about the isolation and ridicule of groups of people adhering to a specific doctrine such as fascism, or political party which harnesses racism to drive xenophobia and exclusiveness. Muslims are often guilty of exclusiveness, and racism is the product of that, rather than its engine. An anti-racist campaign must be mounted among Muslims, that challenges racist expression whether open or closeted in meeting rooms. And the racism that must be challenged, emphatically must include anti-semitism along with other combinations of supposed racial attributes.

There is much work to be done. It is urgent. Which Muslims are brave enough to stand up against racism among ourselves, and which are prepared to stand up against racist anti-semites?


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An important article about ISIS 
What ISIS Really Wants by Graeme Wood emphasises the millenarian worldview that ISIS has and its belief that it is positioned to precipitate apocalyptic events that very many Muslims will be familiar with. The article also gives examples of how ISIS uses methods of justifying its actions that will also be very familiar methods to the street-corner preachers of many of the UK's urban Muslim neighbourhoods.

Graeme Wood's article is extraordinarily important for tackling extremism in the UK. It, and another similar article, The secret world of Isis training camps by Hassan Hassan, describe the minhaj, the methods, by which ISIS propagates and justifies its actions in a theological context. Apart from the violent subject matter, the method itself is very familiar to anyone involved with the Salafi awakening that has taken place in the UK over the past three decades. Most UK Muslims will be very familiar with the methods as they have been applied to relatively trivial matters such as the wearing of gold or the number of units of salaah in tarawih in Ramadhaan. Usually they have been deployed by Salafis exhorting others to join them, by challenging traditional practices rooted in orthodox Sunni fiqh, Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, Hambali, etc., and providing coherently argued alternatives that undermine the authority of orthodoxy in the mind of the potential recruit. Over those three decades, orthodox UK Asian Muslim imams and alims have completely failed to provide coherent counter arguments, due mainly to them being utterly ensconced in the century old Deobandi-Bareilvi argument. As a consequence, Salafi-ism has spread to become ordinary across the UK. While my statistics are not specific enough to demonstrate this, I believe that half of all new mosque projects in the UK in the last few years, are Salafi inspired.

There is nothing wrong with Salafi-ism per se, most Salafi jama'ats are many times better at community engagement and community responsibility than Deobandi, Bareilvi and Jama'at Islami (Maudoodi-ist, Islamic Movement) jama'ats and their organisers. But the method, the minhaj, has been one of antagonistic confrontation, using interpretations of source material intended to undermine the arguments of orthodoxy. ISIS use the same methods. Orthodox imams and alims will continue to fail to provide counter-instruction because, as I have said very publicly, they are completely unequipped to provide it - they simply do not have the knowledge.

For the last two decades, both individual and organised militants of the kind that have found their way into terrorism, have co-opted Salafi methods and twisted them to their own ends. Usually this has been done by individuals and small groups without the patience to analyse sophisticated tracts by advanced Al Qaeda theoreticians. ISIS, however, have as everyone has seen, packaged the mesasge up into very contemporary media, and are sitting in the very place where apocalypse-aware Muslims have been told to look. The more that comfortable westernised Muslim intellectuals decry ISIS without answering the specific theological challenges that ISIS makes, the more they look like the munafiqeen ('hypocrites' - traitors) that ISIS paint them as and that the apocalyptic prophecies foretold.

At this crucial point, Salafis have a vital job to do. They have to move from being the (mostly unintending) instruments of ISIS's rapid uptake, to being pivotal in undermining it. Shaikh Abdullaah al-Bukhaaree's fatwa is a start, but doesn't address the potency of the counter-claim that ISIS themselves are the force to end fitna. And it doesn't have much impact on the street corners of Whitechapel or Sparkbrook.

Countering ISIS's major impact on UK Muslims requires the following:

1. Salafis need to renounce the antagonistic methods they have used to garner support until now. They must replace it with tolerance and respect for different practices, which for them means, respect for the religious scholarship and authority that supports those practices. They must exhort their followers to do the same. They have a lot of burnt bridges to rebuild.

2. Proper, informed, educated debate has to take place across the Muslim community among its scholars and leaders, that puts aside sectarian differences and focuses on a corpus of argument that provides a sound, religiously based counter argument to the extremists. Bareilvis, Deobandis, etc, must recognise that their previous preoccupation with exclusive adherence to their own sect, has failed. They too must learn mutual tolerance and respect.

3. Salafis must produce, urgently, an emphatic and agreed document that clearly separates and opposes their doctrines to those of ISIS.

4. Government, security advisors and the media, must allow the Muslim community the space to debate extremist issues openly and fully without fear of being demonised or prosecuted. The theological debates that need to be had are complex and expose deep and controversial issues. Unless they are discussed with clarity and comprehensively, they will remain sources that ISIS and its ilk can exploit.

5. All masjids must end sectarian intolerance and exclusiveness. The Muslim community is plural, and that pluralism must be reflected in the way masjids are run, with full respect for differences and the masjid's resources shared between them. Sectarian exclusivity and sly briefing or rampant polemics against other sects creates the shadows which are used by extremists to nurture their beliefs and cultivate followers.


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